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Downstream merger with upstream
market power
Kjell Erik Lommerud∗, Odd Rune Straume†, Lars Sørgard‡
Abstract
We examine how a downstream merger aﬀects input prices
and, in turn, the profitability of a such a merger under Cournot
competition with diﬀerentiated products. Input suppliers can be
interpreted as ordinary upstream firms, or trade unions organis-
ing workers. If the input suppliers are plant-specific, we find that
a merger is more profitable than in a corresponding model with
exogenous input prices. In contrast to the received literature, we
find that it can be more profitable to take part in a merger than
being an outsider. For firm-specific input suppliers, on the other
hand, results are reversed. We apply our model to endogenous
merger formation in an international oligopoly, and show that
the equilibrium market structure is likely to be characterised by
cross-border merger.
JEL Classification: J51, L13, L41
Keywords: merger profitability, input suppliers, trade unions,
cross-border merger
1 Introduction
Downstream mergers may aﬀect not only output prices, but also input
prices. Empirical work suggests that mergers can aﬀect wages, the price
of one of the most important inputs to production (see e.g. Peoples et al.,
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1993, and McGuckin et al., 1995). Despite this, the theoretical literature
on mergers typically does not investigate possible links between mergers
on the one hand and wages and other input prices on the other, but
rather concerns itself with how a merger aﬀects the rivalry among firms
in the downstream market.1 The purpose of this paper is precisely to
study how a downstreammerger may trigger lower or higher input prices,
and how this in turn influences the profitability of the merger.
Can a merger that is wholly anti-competitive be profitable? This
question was raised in a well-known paper by Salant et al. (1983). They
showed that in a model with homogeneous goods, Cournot competition,
linear demand and exogenously given and equal marginal costs, only
mergers that almost lead to a full-blown monopoly would be profitable.
This is quite a counter-intuitive result, and many authors have high-
lighted the weaknesses of this model. Another prediction in the Salant
et al. model is that free-riding incentives are always present: even if a
merger is profitable it would be even more profitable for firms not to
take part in the merger.2 One aspect of the Salant et al. model is that
a merger is seen simply as the elimination of one firm in an oligopoly.
The merged entity is no larger or diﬀerent than any other firm that did
not participate in the merger. Deneckere and Davidson (1985) used a
model where a merged unit is larger than any of the original firms, in
the sense that the participants keep all their brands after the merger.3
Assuming product diﬀerentiation and Bertrand competition, they found
that merger without marginal cost savings tend to be profitable. Even
in this setting, though, it is better to free-ride on the merger than to
participate.
1There are a few notable exceptions. González-Maestre and López-Cuñat (2001)
and Ziss (2001) analyse merger in a homogeneous Cournot model where each owner
delegates output decisions to a manager. The manager’s incentive scheme, which
is endogenous in the model and thereby aﬀected by a merger, can be regarded as
an input price. Since the incentive scheme is set be the owner, these models are
distinctly diﬀerent from ours, where we have independent input suppliers that set
input prices. In Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (2000) a merger aﬀects wage setting.
However, they analyse a merger from duopoly to monopoly. Horn and Wolinsky
(1988a) apply a bargaining model to analyse a merger from duopoly to monopoly,
either upstream (unions) or downstream (firms). Our approach is diﬀerent in several
ways, though. Horn and Wolinsky consider downstream merger only in the case of
a single upstream input supplier. For our purposes, this turns out to be the least
interesting case. Furthermore, since we are concerned about the well-known free-rider
problem in the merger literature, we apply a model which includes a non-merging
firm.
2This free rider problem was first pointed out in Stigler (1950). Fridolfsson and
Stennek (2000a) show that this mechanism may delay a merger rather than prevent
it completely.
3See also Lommerud and Sørgard (1997).
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Perry and Porter (1985), along with Farrell and Shapiro (1990a,
1990b) and McAfee and Williams (1992), also challenged the view that a
merged firm is no ‘larger’ than any of the constituent firms. These stud-
ies introduce the existence of some ‘crucial assets’ that are in limited
supply in order to capture the notion that some firms are larger than
others in a homogenous product industry. This assumption implies rising
marginal cost of output production, and, consequently, there are internal
cost savings from mergers, which could make a merger profitable.4
Our contribution is to point out that even without the possibility of
internal cost savings from a merger, lower marginal costs can also result
from the fact that other parties - external to the firm - lowers the prices
they charge from the merged unit. The core substance of the paper is an
attempt to delineate under which circumstances a downstream merger
can have this beneficial eﬀect on input prices - and thereby marginal
costs - that in turn would suggest profitable anti-competitive mergers
and an elimination of the free-rider paradox.56
In the present paper, the downstream market is described by a three-
firm Cournot oligopoly model with diﬀerentiated products.7 Each pro-
ducer is locked in a bilateral monopoly situation with its own indepen-
dent input supplier.8 A trade union may be a prime example, but the
model is meant to have a broader applicability. The input supplier is
assumed unilaterally to set the input price that the downstream firm
faces.9 As is common in the vertical relations literature, this is assumed
4Fridolfsson and Stennek (2000b) also work with the assumption that a merger in
oligopoly can lower marginal cost.
5If the supply curve of the input supplying industry is upward-sloping, it is
straightforward that a contraction of the downstream industry, following a merger,
can lead to lower input prices. Here the focus is on how input suppliers can choose
to lower their prices as a strategic response to the merger.
6A referee has drawn our attention to Creane and Davidson (2000). In this paper,
a merged firm retains the original firms as divisions with some autonomy. The
headquarter can stage a Stackelberg quantity-setting game among the divisions, and
this can lead to profitable mergers with insiders benefitting more than outsiders. A
quite parallel research eﬀort is Huck, Konrad and Müller (2003).
7As we show in Lommerud, Straume and Sørgard (2000), results are quite parallel
in a model with Bertand competition in the output market.
8The existence of bilateral monopolies is a natural assumption if input suppliers
are trade unions. Generally, the plausibility of the assumption requires a certain
degree of asset specificity, which creates a ‘lock-in’ eﬀect. Sunk investments which
increase the value of trade between a buyer (downstream firm) and seller (upstream
firm) also creates a switching cost, which decreases the value, in relative terms,
of any outside option. A typical example of such investments is irreversible R&D
expenditures.
9By letting the input supplier set prices, we have de facto applied a monopoly
union model in the cases where the input suppliers are trade unions. It can be shown
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to happen prior to the Cournot subgame in the final product market. In
the case where the input supplier is a trade union, we study how out-
comes are aﬀected by how much weight the unions put on achieving a
high wage relative to obtaining a high level of employment. In the case
where the input supplier is a firm, we think profit maximisation is the
more natural assumption. However, it could be that the firm rather is
sales oriented, which corresponds to a union that puts a high emphasis
on employment.
If a merger takes place, the merged entity will continue to produce
both of its brands. Each of the plants will keep its own input supplier,
but we discuss the possibility that these suppliers do or do not coordi-
nate their behaviour. The two input suppliers of the merged firm can
become indirect competitors, though, because the downstream firm now
in principle can choose if it wants to serve the market by the one or
the other of its two brands. Product diﬀerentiation of course limits the
severity of this indirect competition. Focusing on the central questions of
whether or not mergers are profitable, and whether or not firms prefer to
be among the merger participants, the degree of product diﬀerentiation
- as well as the degree to which input suppliers are sales (employment)
oriented - turn out to be of crucial importance.
We distinguish between three diﬀerent ways to organise the sup-
ply of input: the input suppliers can be plant-specific, firm-specific or
industry-specific. These distinctions also turn out to be very important
for questions about merger profitability.10 Plant-specific input supply
means that each plant has its own independent supplier both before
and after a possible merger. This is arguably the more natural assump-
tion where the input suppliers are firms. It also seems natural in the
trade union context when bargaining structures are very decentralised,
or when the merger in question is an international one.
Firm-specific input supply means that the two involved input suppli-
ers act in an uncoordinated manner prior to the merger, but that they
too merge in response to a downstream merger. We think this perhaps is
most relevant in the trade union example for countries where bargaining
takes place at a company rather than at the plant level.11 We do not
that our results are valid also in a setting with an eﬃcient bargaining model rather
than a monopoly union, see Lommerud, Straume and Sørgard (2000).
10There is a comparatively large literature on international unionised oligopoly,
see, e.g., Naylor (1998) and Lommerud et al. (2003). In much of this literature the
degree of bargaining centralisation is not very important. This changes, however,
once the possibility of mergers is introduced.
11The causal link between corporate and trade union mergers is identified in several
empirical studies (e.g. Buchanan, 1974, 1981, and Chitayat, 1979). See also Geroski
and Knight (1984).
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rule out that it in some cases also can be relevant for firms as input
suppliers. Industry-specific input suppliers mean that all input suppliers
in the industry coordinate their actions both before and after a possible
merger. This type of bargaining structure can be found in some Eu-
ropean countries. It is also relevant for highly concentrated upstream
industries.
Our main focus is directed towards the case of plant-specific input
suppliers, which dramatically changes the results from a model with
exogenous input prices. As is well known from the trade union theory,
a monopoly input supplier will choose a price-quantity combination on
the input demand schedule, and the optimal behaviour of the input
supplier is determined by the elasticity of input demand. So, how does
a downstream merger influence the elasticity of input demand for the
two suppliers involved in the merger? First, a merger leads to a negative
shift in the demand for inputs. This is derived from the dampening-
of-competition eﬀect in the product market. A demand reduction in
the product market in turn leads to a reduction in demand for inputs.
Second, a merger also aﬀects the slope of the input demand curve by
making demand more responsive to input price changes. The reason is
that the merger enables the merged firm to shift production between its
two plants. It can partly replace a share of one of its product’s sale by
increasing the sale of the other product.12
Both eﬀects contribute to more elastic input demand, and the sup-
pliers of the merged firm will consequently respond to the merger by
lowering the prices they charge, which obviously contributes positively
to the profitability of a merger. For a large set of parameter values this
is enough to turn an unprofitable merger into a profitable one. The only
case where a merger is not profitable in a setting with plant-specific in-
put suppliers is when the input supplier has very strong preferences for
sales. For instance, a highly employment oriented trade union would
imply that wages are close to the competitive level initially, so that a
merger has only a limited eﬀect on wages.
A downstream merger will also influence the elasticity of input de-
mand for the input supplier linked to the non-participating firm, imply-
ing that also the outsider’s input price will change. However, we show
that the merging firm’s input prices are always lower than the non-
merging firm’s input price. This explains why the free-rider paradox
can be solved by introducing endogenous input prices. The exception
12The potential for replacement depends on the substitutability between the prod-
ucts. In the limit with perfect substitutes there is a one-to-one relationship, while at
the other extreme - when products are independent in demand - there is no replace-
ment potential at all.
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is, again, the case of highly sales oriented input suppliers. In this case
the merger has only limited eﬀects on input prices, and the traditional
result about merger in Cournot oligopoly applies.
If the input suppliers are firm- rather than plant-specific, our results
are reversed. In this case a merger implies a higher concentration also
in the upstream market, which reduces the rivalry between the input
suppliers. Amerger consequently results in higher input prices, and more
so for the merging firms than for the non-merging firm. Not surprisingly,
a merger is now less profitable than in the case with exogenous input
prices. In this case a merger is unprofitable under Cournot competition
unless the products are highly diﬀerentiated and the input suppliers are
highly sales oriented. Since input prices increase more for the merging
firms, an outsider earns more from a merger than a participant. Thus,
the traditional result in the literature is restored in this respect.
We also apply our model to endogenous merger formation. A firm
can merge either with another domestic firm or with a foreign firm.
Given that the input suppliers are trade unions, we argue that a do-
mestic downstream merger may lead to union merger as well, whereas a
merger between a domestic and a foreign firm would not lead to such a
union merger. By applying the approach introduced in Horn and Persson
(2001a) we show that, for a large set of parameter values, the equilib-
rium market structure is cross-border merger. The reason is that such a
merger would reduce rents among the input suppliers, while a domestic
merger would have the opposite eﬀect.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section we present the
model, with a benchmark for comparison. In Section 3 we investigate
downstream merger with plant-specific input suppliers, while we in Sec-
tion 4 analyse how our results change if we have either firm-specific or
industry-specific input suppliers. In Section 5 we apply the model to en-
dogenous merger formation, and in Section 6 we discuss some extensions
of our model. We oﬀer some concluding remarks in Section 7.
2 Some preliminaries
Consider an oligopoly industry that consists of three firms, each produc-
ing one brand of a diﬀerentiated product. Firm i produces brand i in
quantity qi. There is no entry or threat of entry, and firms compete in
Cournot fashion. For the moment we assume that firms 1 and 2 are the
merger candidates. Later on, we allow for endogenous merger forma-
tion. We assume that the merged firm continues to produce two brands
(1 and 2), making it ‘larger’ than either of the pre-merger firms. The
outsider (firm 3) continues to produce one brand (3). As a benchmark
for comparison, we start out by considering the case of exogenous input
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prices.
A benchmark
Demand for the diﬀerentiated product is characterised by a symmet-
ric demand system, where the inverse demand function for brand 1 is
given by
p1 = 1− q1 − b (q2 + q3) , (1)
with a corresponding demand structure for the other brands. The para-
meter b ∈ h0, 1i is a measure of substitutability in demand. If b→ 0 the
brands are regarded as (almost) unrelated, whereas b → 1 corresponds
to the case of (almost) homogeneous goods.
There is only one factor of production, and one unit of input is sup-
plied to the downstream firm at a price w. We assume homogeneous
inputs and identical technologies, so the only factors that ties a certain
brand to a firm are patent rights or sunk marketing investments.
We adopt a very simple linear production function, given by
qi = li, (2)
where qi is total quantity produced (of brand i) by firm i, and li is the
total amount of input employed by firm i. In this case, output and input
are equivalent.
As a benchmark for later comparison, consider the following result:
Lemma 1 If input prices are exogenous and equal across firms, a down-
stream merger is profitable if b < 0.55, and more profitable for the out-
sider than for a participant.
Proof. Results follow directly from Lommerud and Sørgard (1997).
An outsider’s best response to a reduction in sales by the merging
firm is to increase its sales, thereby reducing the profitability of a merger.
The eﬀect of the outsiders’ response may dominate so that a merger is
unprofitable. However, each outsider’s response is dampened if products
are diﬀerentiated. This explains why a merger can be profitable under
Cournot competition if products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated.13
13Note that the benchmark for our analysis is not a Salant et al. (1983) type
of model, where merger only leads to one firm disappearing, but a Lommerud and
Sørgard (1997) type of model where a merged firm is ‘larger’ than other firms because
it now controls two brands. There is a close parallel to Baye, Crocker and Ju (1996),
where keeping a divisionalised structure, for example after a merger, plays much the
7
Irrespective of the nature of competition, the outsider will be a free-
rider on the merger. It will experience higher prices and higher sales, and
will therefore gain more from the merger, compared with the insiders.
The upstream market
We model the upstream market in such a way that input suppliers
can be interpreted as either traditional profit maximising firms, or as
trade unions which maximise union welfare. The most convenient way
is to model the input supplier as a trade union, and then treat the
profit maximising firm as a special version of the utility maximising
trade union. For the moment then, let us consider the trade union. We
assume that wages are unilaterally set by monopoly unions.14 They are
characterised by identical Stone-Geary utility functions, given by
Ui = (wi − w)θ (li)1−θ , (3)
where the parameter θ ∈ h0, 1i captures the relative importance of wages
and employment to the unions.15 The reservation wage, w, is equal to
the wage that could be earned in the competitive sector of the economy.
For simplicity, w will be set equal to zero.
Now it is easily seen that, with w = 0, a profit maximising input
supplier would be analogous to a union that maximises rents. Further,
setting θ = 1/2, we have a maximisation problem that is equivalent
to the one facing profit maximising upstream firms that are allowed to
set the prices of the input they deliver to downstream firms. When
θ → 0, this means that the upstream input suppliers only care about
sales/employment. This approximates the situation one would get if the
input supplier is a price taker at a competitively given price.
The structure of the upstream market is assumed to be exogenously
given.16 Our main focus is directed towards the case which we find most
interesting, namely that of plant-specific input supply, in which input
same role as keeping ‘brands’ in our previous model. Another related model is found
in Deneckere and Davidson (1985), where the merged firm has two subsidiaries each
selling its own brand. In contrast to our basic model, though, firms compete in prices
(Bertrand).
14As pointed out by e.g. Dowrick (1989), this can be viewed as a limiting case of
the wage-bargaining union, where the union has all the bargaining strength.
15θ can be viewed as a measure of labour market distortion caused by unions.
When θ → 0 the wage approaches the competitive level. θ is assumed to be equal for
all unions.
16The observation of great variation in the organisation of upstream markets - for
example trade union structure - across diﬀerent countries and industries indicates
the importance of various institutional determinants of the organisation of input
suppliers.
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suppliers are unable to coordinate their prices across diﬀerent plants.
This structure might be the natural one when the input suppliers are
upstream, profit maximising firms, since there are no institutional mech-
anisms implying that a downstream merger should trigger a merger be-
tween input suppliers. In addition, in markets where firms are located
in diﬀerent countries, there are obviously both geographical and cultural
obstacles to input supply cooperation. In particular, whereas interna-
tional merger is a highly prevalent phenomenon among firms, we hardly
ever observe a formal cooperation between trade unions across borders.17
One main reason is probably that capital is highly mobile between coun-
tries, whereas labour is generally not.
With domestic mergers, though, a natural modelling approach might
in some cases be to assume firm-specific input suppliers. For example,
trade unions are typically organised within a firm.18 A downstream
merger would then naturally lead to union merger as well. Moreover, it
turns out that the merged firms’ input suppliers are worse oﬀ following a
downstream merger. It is then natural also to investigate the case where
a downstream merger automatically is followed by an upstream merger,
which is captured in the model with firm-specific input suppliers.
Since a merger is a long-term commitment, it is natural for the
merger candidates to anticipate the input suppliers’ response to a down-
stream merger. Accordingly, we let the merger decision be taken at the
first stage of the game. Moreover, we would expect the input suppli-
ers to anticipate how their price setting aﬀects the price setting in the
downstream market. These assumptions imply the following sequence of
moves:
Stage 1: Firms 1 and 2 decide whether or not to merge.
Stage 2: The input suppliers set input prices.
Stage 3: The downstream firms set quantities.
17In 1999, the share of all mergers and aquisitions, in terms of value, that was
cross-border reached nearly 31 per cent (UNCTAD, 2000).
18Unions are not firm-specific in all countries. In countries with very decentralised
bargaining structures, as the US and the UK (to the extent that these still are
unionised countries), this might perhaps best be represented as plant-specific union-
ism, especially when there is a substantial product diﬀerentiation among the divisions
in a merged entity. The recent strike at Boeing, following the merger with McDonnell
Douglas, can perhaps best be interpreted as a plant-specific union struggling, after a
merger, to avoid cut-backs in employment at precisely their own plant.
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3 Plant-specific input suppliers
With plant-specific input suppliers, input prices are determined at plant
level. The decision of whether or not to merge, is assumed to be based
on a payoﬀ comparison with the no-merger benchmark equilibrium. In
the no-merger game, firm i chooses li to maximise
πi = (pi − wi) li, (4)
where wi is the input price set by firm i’s input supplier, which maximises
Ui = (wi)
θ (li)
1−θ . (5)
In the post-merger game, the merged firm chooses l1 and l2 to maximise
πm = (p1 − w1) l1 + (p2 − w2) l2, (6)
wherew1 andw2 are the input prices set by the input suppliers at plants 1
and 2, respectively. These input suppliers set their prices simultaneously,
and non-cooperatively, by maximising
U1 = (w1)
θ (l1)
1−θ (7)
and
U2 = (w2)
θ (l2)
1−θ . (8)
Regarding the input price response to a merger, we have the following
result:19
Lemma 2 (i) w3 > wi if θ < 12 or b is suﬃciently low.
(ii) wi > w1 = w2.
(iii) w3 > w1 = w2.
The merging firms’ input prices fall, while the input price set by
the outsider’s input supplier will increase or decrease, depending on the
degree of product diﬀerentiation, and union preferences in the case of
trade unions. Importantly, though, the merged firm always faces lower
input prices than the outsider.
The intuition behind these results can be traced by considering the
input suppliers’ maximisation problem in more detail. The first-order
condition for input supplier i can be expressed as
ηi =
θ
1− θ , (9)
19All remaining proofs are presented in Appendix B. Regarding notation, subscript
i refers to the symmetric no-merger outcome, whereas all other subscripts refer to
the post-merger outcome.
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where ηi is the price elasticity of input demand for firm i, given by
ηi = −
∂li (wi,w−i)
∂wi
wi
li (wi,w−i)
. (10)
Given the input prices set by other input suppliers, w−i, supplier i
will set a pricewi that equates the perceived input demand elasticity with
its relative preferences for prices over total sales. By setting an input
price, the input supplier in eﬀect chooses a price-quantity combination
on the relevant input demand schedule. Given the preferences, input
demand elasticity governs optimal behaviour.
A merger in the downstream market will lead to a change in input
prices only if the elasticity ηi is changed as a result of the merger. From
(10) we see that the price elasticity of input demand depends on the
demand schedule li (wi,w−i) in two diﬀerent ways.
First, there is an eﬀect through changes in the slope of the demand
curve. If the demand for input i becomes more (less) responsive to price
changes, i.e. if |∂li/∂wi| increases (decreases), this will, ceteris paribus,
make input demand more (less) elastic, which leads to a reduction (in-
crease) in the price set by supplier i.
Second, there is a demand shifting eﬀect. For a given set of input
prices, an increase (decrease) in demand for input i will make the demand
facing supplier i less (more) elastic. Ceteris paribus, this leads supplier
i to set a higher (lower) input price.
Let us start out by investigating the first eﬀect. From the input
demand functions of the pre-merger game (see Appendix A) we have
that
−∂li (w, b)
∂wi
=
2 + b
2 (2− b) (1 + b) . (11)
A downstream merger gives rise to asymmetric input demand in the in-
dustry, and from the post-merger input demand functions we can derive
−∂l1 (w, b)
∂w1
= −∂l2 (w, b)
∂w2
=
(4− b2)
4 (2 + 2b− b2) (1− b) , (12)
−∂l3 (w, b)
∂w3
=
(1 + b)
(2 + 2b− b2) . (13)
Comparing (11) and (12) we find that
−∂l1 (w, b)
∂w1
−
µ
−∂li (w, b)
∂wi
¶
=
b2 (2 + b) (3− b)
4 (2 + 2b− b2) (1− b) (2− b) (1 + b) > 0.
As a result of the downstream merger, the input demand facing a
supplier of one of the merging firms becomes more price responsive.
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Ceteris paribus, this leads to an increase in the elasticities η1 and η2,
which lowers the optimal input prices set by the suppliers of the merger
participants. This eﬀect is due to the fact that the merged firm is able to
shift production between its two plants, making the input demand more
responsive to input price diﬀerentials between the two suppliers of the
merged firm. The strength of this eﬀect depends on the substitutability
in demand of the final goods. A lower degree of product diﬀerentiation
implies that the merger-induced competition between the input suppliers
intensifies. In the extreme case where products are homogeneous, there
is no scope for input price diﬀerentials, since the merged firm in that
case will produce only at the low-cost plant. In this case, both input
suppliers are forced to set prices at the reservation level.
The demand shifting eﬀect is also present. For a given wage vectorw,
a downstreammerger implies a reduction of output, and thus a reduction
of input demand, from the merged firm. This is due to the familiar eﬀect
of a merger, where the merger participants coordinates their production
volumes in order to internalise a negative externality. Ceteris paribus,
this also leads to an increase in η1 and η2, as seen from (10), implying
lower input prices for the merged firm. Since both eﬀects pull in the
same direction, we will always observe lower input prices after a merger
in an industry with plant-specific input suppliers.
At least for relatively high values of b, though, the first eﬀect (more
price responsive input demand) is clearly the important one. This is
seen most clearly by considering the limit case of homogeneous products.
From (12) we see that b→ 1 implies−∂l1/∂w1 = −∂l2/∂w2 →∞. Thus,
the suppliers of the merged firm face perfectly elastic demand for their
inputs when the final products are homogeneous.
We now turn to study the eﬀect of a downstream merger on the
input price of the outside firm. This can be analysed in a similar way.
Comparing (11) and (13) we find that
−∂l3 (w, b)
∂w3
−
µ
−∂li (w, b)
∂wi
¶
=
−b3
2 (2 + 2b− b2) (2− b) (1 + b) < 0.
The input demand facing the supplier of the outside firm becomes
less price responsive as a result of the merger. Ceteris paribus, this leads
to a decrease in η3, which raises the optimal input price set by supplier 3.
This follows from reduced product market competition due to the merger.
A more concentrated downstream industry means that the market share
of a non-participating firm is less responsive to a change in the firm’s
production costs, which implies that input demand is less responsive to
changes in input prices.20
20This eﬀect is in line with findings in related union-oligopoly models, where input
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The initial demand shifting eﬀect goes in the same direction. For a
given set of input prices, the optimal response to the merger is for the
outside firm to expand output, which implies a decrease η3. However,
this is not the whole story. The competition between input suppliers
causes additional strategic responses that could overturn the initial de-
mand shifting eﬀect for the outside firm. Since input prices are strategic
complements, the incentive to set a higher price by the supplier to the
outside firm is moderated by the input price reduction for the merged
firm, and vice versa. However, because of the post-merger asymmetry
- with incentives for input price responses being larger for the suppli-
ers to the merged firm - this eﬀect is clearly more pronounced for the
outside firm. Consequently, if the input price reduction for the merged
firm is suﬃciently large, the strategic complementarity in input price
setting could cause a reduction of input prices also for the outside firm,
compared with the no-merger equilibrium. From Lemma 2 we see that
this will be the case if θ and b are suﬃciently high. This confirms the
intuition: the degree of strategic complementarity in input prices is in-
creasing in θ, whereas a large value of b implies that the incentives for
input price reductions are strong for the suppliers to the merged firm.21
Having established the eﬀect of a downstream merger on input prices
set by plant-specific upstream suppliers, we are now ready to state the
following result about the profitability of such a merger:
Proposition 3 With plant-specific input suppliers, a merger is (i) al-
ways profitable for the participants unless b > 0.55 and θ is close to zero,
and (ii) more profitable for a participant than for the outsider unless θ
is very low.
We see from Proposition 1 that the results in the received literature
- referred to in Lemma 1 - are reproduced when θ approaches zero.22 As
already noted, in this case an input supplier (trade union) only cares
about sales (employment). Consequently, a price (wage) close to the
reservation price (wage) results both before and after the merger. We
are in fact close to what the situation would have been with an input
supplier (trade union) without market power. In this case, a merger (in
the limit) has no eﬀect on input prices, and it is profitable only if the
products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated (b < 0.55).
prices are wages (see e.g. Dowrick, 1989).
21From the first-order conditions for optimal input prices it is easily confirmed that
∂2wi(wj ,b,θ)
∂wj∂θ
> 0, i 6= j.
22This is illustrated in Figure 1, where θ = 0 can be interpreted as the case with
exogenous input prices. We see that there is a cutoﬀ point at b = 0.55. For b < 0.55,
a merger is profitable.
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Figure 1: Merger profitability with plant-specific input suppliers.
If input suppliers are profit maximising firms - the case of θ = 1/2
- we see from the Proposition that a merger is always profitable for
the merging firms, and it is always more beneficial to participate in the
merger, rather than being an outsider. Obviously, the driving force is
the input price changes reported in Lemma 1. The merged firm will face
lower input prices, and these prices are lower than the corresponding
input price for the outside firm.
If the input suppliers are trade unions, we see from the Proposition
that it matters whether or not they are employment oriented. If an
input-supplying firm is not a profit maximiser, it matters correspond-
ingly how it weighs a higher price against lower sales. Here, we con-
centrate on the trade union example. We find the existence of a hump-
shaped relationship between θ and post-merger wage responses.23 This,
in turn, determines a similar relationship between θ and merger prof-
itability. For low levels of θ, pre-merger input prices are close to the
competitive level, and there is not much room for wage reductions. As
θ increases, the larger is the merger-induced wage reduction, increasing
the profitability of the merger. However, for very high values of θ, the
unions have a strong preference for high wages, and even though there
are considerable room for wage reductions, a merger will only trigger
small wage adjustments. Nevertheless, for values of θ close to 1, even a
marginal reduction in post-merger wages will make a merger profitable
for the participants.
Product diﬀerentiation triggers two opposing forces in our model,
23This is quite natural. A change in wages takes place if a merger changes the
trade-oﬀ between wages and employment. This trade-oﬀ is of importance when both
wages and employment matter for the trade unions, which is especially the case for
medium values of θ. Equilibrium input prices and profits are provided in Appendix
A.
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Figure 2: Insider versus outsider profitability of a merger when input
suppliers are plant-specific.
and the strength of these forces are determined by the degree of dif-
ferentiation. On the one hand, a lower degree of product diﬀerentiation
makes the outsider’s aggressive response stronger, which tends to make a
merger less profitable (cf. Lemma 1). On the other hand, if products are
close substitutes, the degree of competition between input suppliers is
fierce, making a merger highly eﬀective as a disciplinary device towards
the input suppliers. From Proposition 1 it is apparent that these two
eﬀects tend towards cancelling each other out, making a merger prof-
itable for every degree of product diﬀerentiation, the exception being
highly sales (employment) oriented input suppliers (unions). As shown
in Figure 1, a merger is profitable even if products are (almost) identical
as long as θ is above a certain threshold level.
From Lemma 2 we know that the input price reduction following a
merger is always larger for the merged firm, compared with the outsider.
This helps explain the result illustrated in Figure 2. A participant gains
more from a merger, compared with the non-participant. This is always
true for the profit maximising input supplier, and true for the case of
trade unions as long as the unions are suﬃciently wage oriented. Fur-
thermore, from Figure 2 we also see that if θ and b are suﬃciently high,
a downstream merger will actually harm the outside firm, in terms of
profits.
4 Other types of input supply structures
As demonstrated in the previous section, a downstream merger may
lead to a reduction in upstream rents when input suppliers are plant-
specific. This suggests that a downstream merger could provide the
input suppliers with extra incentives for input price coordination. One
15
way to do so is for the merging downstream firms’ input suppliers to
merge.24 In this case, the input suppliers are firm- rather than plant-
specific. In this section we contrast the outcome derived in the previous
section for plant-specific input suppliers with the case of firm-specific
input suppliers.25 In addition, we briefly describe the case of a single
input supplier for the entire industry.
4.1 Firm-specific input suppliers
If input suppliers are firm-specific, a merger between two or more firms
will implicitly lead to a higher degree of centralisation in input price
setting, since the merged firm only confronts one input supplier in the
post-merger game. In the second stage of the post-merger game, the
merged firm chooses l1 and l2 to maximise
πm = (p1 − wm) l1 + (p2 − wm) l2, (14)
where wm is the input price set by the merged firm’s input supplier,
which maximises
Um = (wm)
θ (l1 + l2)
1−θ . (15)
Lemma 4 wm > w3 > wi.
After the merger, equilibrium input prices increase for both the in-
siders and the outsider, but the merged firm faces a higher input price
than the outsider. Comparing with Lemma 2, the results are reversed
when we go from plant-specific to firm-specific input suppliers.
The intuition for the results in Lemma 3 can be developed along the
same lines as our discussion of input price responses with plant-specific
input suppliers. From the input demand functions in the post-merger
game with firm-specific input suppliers (see Appendix A) we can derive
−∂l1 (w, b)
∂wm
= −∂l2 (w, b)
∂wm
=
1
2 + 2b− b2 , (16)
−∂l3 (w, b)
∂w3
=
1 + b
2 + 2b− b2 . (17)
24Collusion is another way this can be achieved, but this is not further pursued in
the present paper. For such an analysis within the context of a unionised international
duopoly, see Straume (2002).
25See once again the references in footnote 9 about how company mergers in many
settings also imply a trade union merger.
16
A comparison of (16)-(17) and (11) reveals that
−∂l1 (w, b)
∂wm
−
µ
−∂li (w, b)
∂wi
¶
=
− (4 + 2b− b2) b
2 (2− b) (1 + b) (2 + 2b− b2) < 0,
−∂l3 (w, b)
∂w3
−
µ
−∂li (w, b)
∂wi
¶
=
−b3
2 (2− b) (1 + b) (2 + 2b− b2) < 0.
A downstream merger means that input demand becomes less price
responsive for all firms. This implies, ceteris paribus, a decrease in the
input demand elasticity, which provides the input suppliers with an in-
centive to increase prices. The mechanisms are analogous to the case of
the outside firm for plant-specific input suppliers.
The incentives for input price increases are partly mitigated by the
demand shifting eﬀects of the merger. The incentives for output reduc-
tions by the merged firm should, ceteris paribus, lead to lower input
prices. We find that this eﬀect is not strong enough to overturn the for-
mer eﬀect. In our model we thus find that a downstream merger leads
to increased input prices for all firms if input suppliers are firm-specific.
After the merger, there is an asymmetry between the firms. The
merged firm oﬀers two brands while the outsider oﬀers one brand. For
a uniform input price in the industry, this would imply that the input
price/sales ratio is lower for the merged firm’s input supplier. It will
then be optimal for the merged firm’s input supplier to set a price in
excess of the input price facing the outside firm. Consequently, the input
price increase due to the merger is larger for the merged firm than for
the non-merged firm.
Implications for merger profitability are stated in the following propo-
sition:
Proposition 5 With firm-specific input suppliers, a merger is (i) prof-
itable for the participants only if b < 0.55 and θ is close to zero, and (ii)
more profitable for the outsider than for a participant.
In Figure 3 we have shown the set of parameter values for which
the merger is profitable for the participants. We see that except for
a few combinations of low θ and low b, a merger is unprofitable. It
suggests that if the input suppliers are profit maximising firms, a merger
is never profitable in the presence of firm-specific input suppliers. If the
input suppliers are trade unions, we have to impose extremely strong
assumptions regarding union preferences for a merger to be profitable.
This is no surprise, given that a merger triggers an input price increase
for the merged firm that is larger than the corresponding input price
increase for the outside firm.
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Figure 3: Merger profitability with firm-specific input suppliers.
Comparing with Figure 1, we see the importance of the input supply
structure. While it is very likely that a merger is profitable with plant-
specific input suppliers, it is highly unlikely that a corresponding merger
in an industry with firm-specific input suppliers is profitable.
Note also from part (ii) of Proposition 2 that, in contrast to our
results with plant-specific input suppliers, it is better being the outsider
than being a participant in the merger. This is, however, in line with
the results in the received literature. Since we know that a merger
with exogenous input prices is more profitable for an outsider than for
an insider, it is obvious that this conclusion still holds when a merger
results in a higher input price increase for the merged firm than for the
non-merged firm.
4.2 An industry-specific input supplier
If there are no obstacles to cooperation between the input suppliers, it is
obvious that the input suppliers could gain by coordinated behaviour. If
input suppliers are profit maximising firms, anti-trust policy would nor-
mally prevent the input suppliers from establishing a cartel or to merge
to a monopoly. If the input suppliers are trade unions, on the other
hand, there are in many countries no constraints on the cooperation
between diﬀerent trade unions. If all the firms in the industry recruit
workers from an integrated labour market with a high degree of worker
mobility, we would reasonably expect the workers to be organised in a
single encompassing union (cf. Horn and Wolinsky, 1988b).
It is easily shown that, in this model, an industry-specific input sup-
plier will set the input price
w = θ, (18)
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regardless of the number of firms in the industry. Thus, a merger would
not aﬀect input prices at all.
A downstream merger causes a reduction of total output, which im-
plies a negative shift in the demand for inputs. Ceteris paribus, this
makes input demand more elastic and should lead to a reduction of the
input price. However, it can easily be shown that the slope of the demand
curve also changes, causing input demand to become less price respon-
sive. These two eﬀects cancel out, leaving the input price unchanged. It
is important to note that this is in fact a fairly general result, and is not
dependent on the specific demand system assumed in this model. In a
recent paper, Dhillon and Petrakis (2002) show that this result holds for
a broad class of industry and demand specifications.
5 An application: Domestic versus international
merger
A corollary of our model is that international mergers can be more prof-
itable than domestic mergers. This prediction can be explored in greater
detail by looking at a more specific set-up. Assume that, pre-merger,
firms 1 and 2 are located in a ‘domestic’ country, whereas firm 3 is lo-
cated in a ‘foreign’ country. To make things simple, we abstract from
trade costs and assume that the firms compete in a single market.26
In our setting, the diﬀerence between a domestic and an international
merger can be found in the organisational responses in the upstream
market. Let us now interpret input suppliers as trade unions. In line
with our previous discussion we assume that a cross-border downstream
merger does not lead to a merger between the trade unions of the merging
firms, whereas, in the case of a domestic downstream merger, this will
indeed be the case.27
In order to make predictions about merger formation in this particu-
lar variant of our model, we will make use of an approach developed by
Horn and Persson (2001a), which treats the merger process as a coop-
erative game of coalition-formation, where the players are free to com-
26This corresponds to the ‘third-market’ model of Brander and Spencer (1985).
27There are a few other recent contributions to the analysis of the pattern of
cross-border mergers. Norbäck and Persson (2002) study the eﬀects of diﬀerent lib-
eralisation programs, with an emphasis on a comparison between greenfield invest-
ments and cross-border merger. Horn and Persson (2001b) focus on domestic versus
cross-border merger, but this is done under the assumption of exogenous production
costs. In another related paper, Straume (2003) endogenises production costs by
introducing unionised labour, but the focus is here on international merger only, in
an industry with both unionised and non-unionsed firms. Finally, Huck and Konrad
(2002) consider the choice between national and cross-country merger when strategic
trade policy possibly could be influenced.
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municate and write binding contracts. Using the terminology of Horn
and Persson, we let an ownership structure Mi be a partition of the set
N = {1, 2, 3} of owners (firms) into coalitions. Excluding the possibility
of complete monopolisation, there are three possible categories of market
structures, with a combined total of four diﬀerent ownership structures:
1. The decentralised structure (no merger): Mn = {1, 2, 3}
2. A domestic merger: Md = {(1 + 2) , 3}
3. A cross-border merger: Mc = {(1 + 3) , 2} and M 0c = {1, (2 + 3)}
Without going into details about the theoretical foundations, the
approach involves a comparison of any two possible ownership structures
Mi and Mj, where Mi is said to dominate Mj (Mi dom Mj) if the
combined profits of the decisive group of owners are larger inMi than in
Mj. The decisive group of owners are the owners that are expected to
be able to influence whether Mi will be formed instead of Mj, and vice
versa.
Which are the decisive owners? We do not allow payments between
coalition, so owners belonging to identical coalitions in the two struc-
tures cannot aﬀect whether Mj will be formed instead of Mi, but all
remaining owners can influence this choice and are thus decisive. If they
participate in a non-singleton coalition in Mj that does not exist in Mi,
this coalition requires the consent of all members of the coalition to be
formed. Alternatively, if they stand alone in Mj and thus lose partners
by moving from Mi to Mj, they can forgo surplus in Mi in order to
prevent Mj from being formed.28
Finally, the solution concept is the core. Those structures that are
in the core (i.e. the structures that are undominated) are defined as
equilibrium ownership structures. Using this criterion, we are able to
state the following:
Proposition 6 The equilibrium market structure implies cross-border
merger, unless b > 0.55 and θ is close to zero, for which the equilibrium
market structure implies no merger.
Given the previous results regarding the eﬀects of downstream merg-
ers on input prices, the intuition behind this result is quite intuitive.
In the model of endogenous merger formation that we use, mergers are
conducive to market structures with large industry profits. In our model
such market structures are characterised by cross-border merger, since
this is a more eﬃcient way to reduce rents among the input suppliers.29
28See Horn and Persson (2001a) for a formal definition of decisive owners.
29It can easily be verified that less rents to input suppliers would lead to more
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6 Extensions
Our basic model is rather stylised, so it is natural to check the robustness
of our results. Let us therefore explain how results may change when we
extend our basic model in three diﬀerent directions. For more details,
see Lommerud, Straume and Sørgard (2000).
1. Bertrand competition
We know from the literature that if Bertrand competition prevails in
a diﬀerentiated products industry, then a merger with exogenous input
prices is always profitable. With plant-specific input suppliers, we find
that this result is reinforced. More interestingly, we find that - as is the
case with Cournot competition and endogenous input prices - an insider
can be better oﬀ than an outsider as a result of a merger. If the input
suppliers are firm-specific, though, a merger can be unprofitable even in
a setting with Bertrand competition. The driving force is the input price
increase following a merger. Hence, our main results hold also in this
extended version of our model. The reason is that the change in input
prices following a merger most of all depends on the rivalry between
the input suppliers, and the nature of this rivalry - input prices being
strategic complements - is independent of the nature of competition in
the downstream market.
2. Eﬃcient bargaining
In the basic model we have assumed that the input suppliers uni-
laterally set the input price while the downstream firms have complete
discretion over sales decisions. In the case of trade unions, this is a
special case of the right-to-manage model. The union and the firm bar-
gain over the wage while the firm sets employment. In the literature
this model is often contrasted with the eﬃcient bargaining model, where
the union has the same relative bargaining strength over wage setting
as well as employment decisions (and possibly other relevant decision
variables). The existing literature suggests that which bargaining game
will emerge as the equilibrium outcome depends on the characteristics
of the industry in question.30
profits to downstream firms. This follows directly from (A.3) in Appendix A, where
we have that ∂πi/∂θ < 0.
30Bughin (1999) finds that eﬃcient bargaining is the most likely equilibrium out-
come, and even more so under the threat of entry. Petrakis and Vlassis (2000) find
that right-to-manage bargaining is the equilibrium outcome if the unions’ bargain-
ing power is suﬃciently high, while Espinosa and Rhee (1989) find that eﬃcient
bargaining may emerge as an equilibrium outcome in infinitely repeated games.
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It is then natural to check whether our results still hold if we apply
an eﬃcient bargaining model rather than a monopoly union model. We
have only investigated the case of plant-specific unions. It turns out
that the qualitative results depend on the relative bargaining strength
of the players. However, we find that our main results are still valid. A
merger can be profitable even in a Cournot setting without any exoge-
nous fixed costs savings, and the insider may earn more from a merger
than an outsider. The intuition is that eﬃcient bargaining introduces
two additional opposing forces. On the one hand, the unions can extract
a share of the potential profit increase following a merger. This tends
to make a merger less profitable in a setting with eﬃcient bargaining.
On the other hand, the merged firm will enjoy an improved bargaining
position since it can bargain with two diﬀerent unions.31 These two op-
posing forces tend towards cancelling each other out for a large set of
parameter values.
3. Multi-plant mergers
We have shown that the presence of plant-specific input suppliers
considerably increases the profitability of a downstream merger between
two single-plant firms. We have also argued that this might be particu-
larly relevant for cross-border mergers. The profitability of a merger in
the plant-specific case is caused by the merger-induced decrease in input
prices, which is strongly related to the merged firm’s ability to re-allocate
production between diﬀerent plants. A natural question is whether our
results are also valid in the case of mergers involving multi-plant firms.
This can be analysed by considering the following example.
Assume that four brands are produced by three diﬀerent firms. One
firm is a multi-plant (and multi-product) firm, whereas the two other
firms are single-plant producers. The eﬀects of diﬀerent types of down-
stream merger on input prices and merger profitability in this case are
calculated in Appendix C. In order to improve the analytical tractability,
we have considered the special case of rent-maximising input suppliers,
i.e. θ = 1
2
.
Regarding the input price responses to a downstream merger, we find
that our previous results are confirmed. Whether we consider a merger
between a two-plant firm and a single-plant firm, or a merger between
two single-plant firms, input prices will decrease for merger participants
and increase for non-participants as long as b < 1. Regarding merger
profitability, we find that both types of merger are always profitable for
θ = 1
2
.
31See also Davidson (1988).
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However, this kind of set-up also raises the issue of which kind of
merger is more likely to be undertaken. Using the endogenous merger
model of Section 5, and excluding the possibility of full monopolisa-
tion, we find that a merger between a two-plant firm and a single-plant
firm is the equilibrium outcome if products are suﬃciently diﬀerenti-
ated. In this case, the merger process is mainly motivated by a quest
for increased market power, and the owners can maximise total industry
profits by forming a highly concentrated market structure. Since the
outside firm will face increased input prices post-merger, this market
structure implies a near-monopoly position for the merger participants.
On the other hand, if products are suﬃciently close substitutes, the
merger process is mainly driven by cost-saving motivations, since pro-
duction costs can be substantially reduced by eliminating all single-plant
firms from the industry. Consequently, the equilibrium outcome is a
merger between the two single-plant firms. In other words, the model
predicts a positive correlation between the degree of product diﬀerenti-
ation and the degree of asymmetry in the market structure. Numerical
simulations confirm that this is a general tendency also for θ 6= 1
2
.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that the organisation of the upstream mar-
ket is decisive for input price responses to a downstream merger, and
hence for the profitability of such a merger. While plant-specific input
suppliers tend to increase the profitability of a merger, and may even
make it more profitable to take part in a merger than being an outsider,
the results are reversed in a setting with firm-specific input suppliers.
Our results suggest that downstream firms considering to merge in
an industry with upstream market power should be concerned about
how the input suppliers respond to a possible merger. The existence
of plant-specific input suppliers is obviously an argument in favour of
a merger, from the viewpoint of downstream firms. The reason is that
a downstream merger triggers stronger competition between the input
suppliers of the merging firms, thereby reducing the rent captured by the
input suppliers. However, the argument in favour of downstream merger
is also an argument in favour of merger between the input suppliers. By
doing so they can prevent the reduction in their own rent. The plant-
specific input suppliers are then not plant-specific after the merger, but
instead de facto firm-specific input suppliers. The downstream firms
should anticipate such an outcome. We extend our model to an endoge-
nous merger model of international versus national mergers to take this
into account. We show that the equilibrium market structure might be
cross-border merger. The reason is that merger between input suppliers
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is less likely in cross-border mergers. If so, the downstream firms merge
across borders to reduce the rent extracted by the input suppliers.
Finally, we think our results could guide future empirical research
on the wage eﬀects of mergers. The results in the received empirical
literature are mixed. Some find support for a wage increase following
a merger, some for a wage cut, while others find no eﬀect at all.32 If
one in the same data material combines mergers with plant-specific and
firm-specific unions, one might find that mergers have - if any - only a
limited eﬀect on wages. According to our results the underlying truth
could be that some mergers result in wage drops while others give wage
rises. A proper empirical test should then start with a detailed study of
the union structure which, in turn, should lead to a discrimination in the
data material between industries with plant- and firm-specific unions.
Appendix A. Equilibrium outcomes
1. No merger
The first-order conditions of the downstream firms’ profit-maximising
problems determine the following input demand function for firm i:
li (w, b) =
2− b− (2 + b)wi + b
³P3
j=1wj − wi
´
2 (2− b) (1 + b) . (A.1)
Using (A.1) to derive input prices and profits in the symmetric Nash
equilibrium, we find that these are given by
wi =
θ (2− b)
2 + b− 2θb, (A.2)
πi =
(2 + b)2 (1− θ)2
4 (1 + b)2 (2 + b− 2θb)2
. (A.3)
2. Plant-specific input suppliers
The input demand functions in the post-merger game are given by
l1 (w, b) =
2 (1− b) (2− b)− (4− b2)w1 + b (4− b)w2 + 2b (1− b)w3
4 (2 + 2b− b2) (1− b) ,
(A.4)
32Cremieux et al. (1996) and Peoples et al. (1993) find support for a wage cut
following a merger, while McGuckin et al. (1995) find the opposite result. Hekmat
(1995) finds no evidence of any link between mergers and wages, while Gokhale et
al. (1993) find no or only limited evidence of a link between takeovers and wages.
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l2 (w, b) =
2 (1− b) (2− b)− (4− b2)w2 + b (4− b)w1 + 2b (1− b)w3
4 (2 + 2b− b2) (1− b) ,
(A.5)
l3 (w, b) =
2− 2 (1 + b)w3 + b (w1 + w2)
2 (2 + 2b− b2) . (A.6)
Using (A.4)-(A.6), we derive the following input prices and profits in the
asymmetric post-merger Nash equilibrium:
w1 = w2 =
2θ (2− b+ θb− 2b2 − θb2 + b3)
η
, (A.7)
w3 =
θ (4− b2 − 5θb2 + 2θb3)
η
, (A.8)
πm =
(1− θ)2 (2− b)2 (2 + b)2 (b+ 1) (2 + b+ θb− b2)2
2 (2 + 2b− b2)2 η2
, (A.9)
π3 =
(1− θ)2 (1 + b)2 (4− b2 − 5θb2 + 2θb3)2
(2 + 2b− b2)2 η2
, (A.10)
where
η = 4 + 4b− 4θb− b2 − 3θb2 − 2θ2b2 − b3 + θb3 + 2θ2b3 > 0.
3. Firm-specific input suppliers
The input demand functions in the post-merger game are given by
l1 (w, b) = l2 (w, b) =
2 (1− wm)− b (1− w3)
2 (2 + 2b− b2) , (A.11)
l3 (w, b) =
1− (1 + b)w3 + bwm
2 + 2b− b2 . (A.12)
Input prices and profits in the asymmetric post-merger Nash equilibrium
are given by
wm =
θ (2 + b+ θb− b2)
2 + 2b− θ2b2
, (A.13)
w3 =
θ (2 + 2θb− θb2)
2 + 2b− θ2b2
, (A.14)
πm =
2 (1− θ)2 (1 + b) (2 + b+ θb− b2)2¡
2 + 2b− θ2b2
¢2
(2 + 2b− b2)2
, (A.15)
π3 =
(1− θ)2 (1 + b)2 (2 + 2θb− θb2)2¡
2 + 2b− θ2b2
¢2
(2 + 2b− b2)2
. (A.16)
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Appendix B. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2. (i) From (A.2) and (A.8), w3 > wi if
θb2 (1− θ) (4− 4θ − 4θb+ 2θb2 − b2)
η (2 + b− 2θb) > 0.
The denominator is obviously positive for θ ∈ h0, 1i, b ∈ h0, 1i. The
numerator is positive if (4− 4θ − 4θb+ 2θb2 − b2) > 0. Rearranging
yields 4 (1− θ (1 + b)) + b2 (2θ − 1) > 0. We see that this condition
holds if θ < 1
2
or if b is suﬃciently low.
(ii) From (A.2) and (A.7), wi > w1 = w2 reduces to
θb (1− θ) (4 + 4b− b2 − b3 − 2θb2 (1− b))
(2 + b− 2θb) η > 0,
which holds for θ ∈ h0, 1i, b ∈ h0, 1i.
(iii) From (A.7) and (A.8), w3 > w1 = w2 reduces to
θb (2b+ 1) (2− b) (1− θ)
η
> 0,
which is true for θ ∈ h0, 1i, b ∈ h0, 1i. ¥
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) A merger is profitable if πm−2πi > 0.
From Lemma 1 we know that this is true if θ = 0 and b < 0.55. From
Lemma 2 it must be the case that this is also true for b < 0.55 and θ > 0.
For b > 0.55 we know (from Lemma 1) that πm−2πi < 0 if θ = 0. Setting
b = 1, we can from (A.3) and (A.9) find that πm − 2πi > 0 if
−9 + 138θ − 127θ2 + 8θ3(1 + θ)
72(2θ − 3)2 > 0.
This condition is met if θ > 0.07. Then we know that for θ ∈ h0, 1i
and b ∈ h0.55, 1i there are critical values where πm = 2πi. In Figure 1
(Section 3) we have plotted the curve where πm = 2πi in a (θ, b)-diagram,
using the expressions in (A.3) and (A.9). It follows immediately that
πm > 2πi above the curve.
(ii) A participant earns πm/2 and the non-merging firm π3 in the
post-merger equilibrium. We know from Lemma 1 that for θ = 0, then
πm−2π3 < 0. Setting b = 1 and using the expressions reported in (A.3)
and (A.10), we have that πm− 2π3 < 0 if 20θ− 7θ2 > 4. This condition
is met if θ < 0.21. Then we know that for θ ∈ h0, 1i and b ∈ h0, 1i
there are critical values where πm− 2π3 = 0. In Figure 2 (Section 3) we
have plotted the curve where πm = 2π3 in a (θ, b)-diagram, using the
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expressions in (A.3) and (A.10). Obviously, πm > 2π3 above the curve .
¥
Proof of Lemma 3. From (A.2), (A.13) and (A.14), and after
rearranging, wm > w3 reduces to
θb (1− b) (1− θ)¡
2 + 2b− θ2b2
¢ > 0,
whereas w3 > wi reduces to
θb2 (1− θ) (2 + 2θ − θb)¡
2 + 2b− θ2b2
¢
(2 + b− 2θb)
> 0.
It can easily be seen that both inequalities hold for θ ∈ h0, 1i, b ∈ h0, 1i.
¥
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) We know from Lemma 1 that if θ = 0,
then πm > (<) 2πi if b < (>) 0.55. From Lemma 3 it must also be the
case that πm < 2πi if b > 0.55 and θ > 0. Then we know that there
are combinations of θ ∈ h0, 1i and b ∈ h0, 0.55i such that πm = 2πi. By
using the expressions in (A.3) and (A.15), we find these combinations of
θ and b. They are plotted in a (θ, b)-diagram in Figure 3 (Section 4.1).
Obviously, πm < 2πi above the curve shown in Figure 3.
(ii) We know from Lemma 1 that for exogenous input prices, πm <
2π3. Given the result in Lemma 3, it is trivial to see that the result in
Lemma 1 applies in this case too. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3. When comparing Md and Mn, the de-
cisive group of owners consists of the merger participants in Md. The
comparison of equilibrium payoﬀs in this case coincides with the case of
firm-specific input suppliers in Section 4.1. Let πi (Mj) be the equilib-
rium profits of firm i in ownership structureMj. From Proposition 2 we
know that πm (Md) > 2πi (Mn), implying Md dom Mn, if b < 0.55 and
θ is close to zero. For other parameter values, the dominance relation
is reversed. Likewise, when comparing Mc and Mn, the decisive owners
are the merger participants inMc. This coincides with the case of plant-
specific input suppliers in Section 3, and from Proposition 1 we know
that πm (Mc) > 2πi (Mn), implying Mc dom Mn, unless b > 0.55 and θ
is close to zero. For this (small) set of parameter values, the dominance
relation is reversed. Finally, when comparingMc andMd, all three own-
ers are decisive. In this case we have to compare total industry profits
in the two diﬀerent market structures. This corresponds to a compar-
ison of post-merger industry profits for the case of plant-specific and
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firm-specific input suppliers, respectively. Using (A.9), (A.10), (A.15)
and (A.16) in Appendix A, we find that
P3
i=1 πi (Mc) >
P3
i=1 πi (Md),
implying Mc dom Md, for the entire set of parameter values. Hence, Mc
is undominated unless b > 0.55 and θ is close to zero, for which Mn is
undominated. ¥
Appendix C. Multi-plant mergers
Consider an industry with three firms and four brands. Firm A
produces two brands, 1 and 2, at diﬀerent plants, whereas brands 3 and
4 are produced by firms B and C, respectively. Brand i is produced
with input supplied by the plant-specific input supplier i. Ruling out
the possibility of merger-to-monopoly by assumption, we can cover all
possible market structures by considering two types of merger: a merger
involving the multi-plant firm (MI) and a merger between the two single-
plant firms (MII).
Extending the symmetrical demand system (1) to four brands, and
setting θ = 1
2
, we find equilibrium input prices and profits to be given
by the following expressions.
1. No merger (M0)
w1 (M0) = w2 (M0) =
(1− b) (2− b) (4 + 5b− 2b2)
2 (8 + 6b− 10b2 + b4) , (C.1)
w3 (M0) = w4 (M0) =
(2− b) (4 + 2b− 5b2 + b3)
2 (8 + 6b− 10b2 + b4) , (C.2)
πA (M0) =
(1 + b)3 (2− b)4 (4 + 5b− 2b2)2
8 (2 + 3b− b2)2 (8 + 6b− 10b2 + b4)2
, (C.3)
πB (M0) = πC (M0) =
(2 + 2b− b2)2 (4 + 2b− 5b2 + b3)2
4 (2 + 3b− b2)2 (8 + 6b− 10b2 + b4)2
.
(C.4)
2. Merger between firms A and B (MI)
w1 (MI) = w2 (MI) = w3 (MI) =
(1− b) (8 + 14b− 7b2)
16 + 32b− 7b2 − 5b3 ,
w4 (MI) =
(2− b) (4− b) (1 + 2b)
(16 + 32b− 7b2 − 5b3) , (C.6)
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πA (MI) + πB (MI) =
3 (1 + 2b) (2 + 2b− b2)2 (8 + 14b− 7b2)2
(4 + 8b− 3b2)2 (16 + 32b− 7b2 − 5b3)2
, (C.7)
πC (MI) =
4 (1 + 2b)2 (8 + 10b− 11b2 + 2b3)2
(4 + 8b− 3b2)2 (16 + 32b− 7b2 − 5b3)2
. (C.8)
3. Merger between firms B and C (MII)
w1 (MII) = w2 (MII) = w3 (MII) = w4 (MII) =
2 (1− b)
(4− b2) , (C.9)
πA (MII) = πB (MII) + πC (MII) =
(1 + b) (2 + 2b− b2)2
2 (1 + 2b)2 (4− b2)2
. (C.10)
We see that the input price responses of a merger follow a general
pattern. Input prices decrease for merger participants and increase for
non-participants. Comparing (C.1)-(C.2) and (C.5)-(C.6) we find that
w1 (MI)−w1 (M0) < 0, w3 (MI)−w3 (M0) < 0 andw4 (MI)−w4 (M0) > 0
for all b ∈ h0, 1i. Likewise, comparing (C.1)-(C.2) and (C.9) we have that
w1 (MII)− w1 (M0) > 0 and w3 (MII)− w3 (M0) < 0 for all b ∈ h0, 1i.
Regarding merger profitability, a comparison of equilibrium prof-
its in the diﬀerent market structures show that πA (MI) + πB (MI) >
πA (M0) + πB (M0) and πB (MII) + πC (MII) > πB (M0) + πC (M0) for
all b ∈ h0, 1i. Thus, both types of merger are always profitable. Us-
ing the endogenous merger model presented in Section 5, the equilib-
rium market structure is in this case determined by a comparison of
total industry profits. Comparing (C.7)-(C.8) and (C.10) we find thatP
π (MII) > (<)
P
π (MI) iﬀ b > (<) 0.75. Thus, the model predicts
a merger between the two single-plant firms if products are suﬃciently
close substitutes, and a merger involving the multi-plant firm otherwise.
Acknowledgements
We thank Kai A. Konrad, Lars Mathiesen, Anne Perrot, two anony-
mous referees and participants at several seminar and conference presen-
tations for valuable comments. An earlier version of the paper has been
circulated with the title “Merger profitability in unionised oligopoly”.
We thank the Norwegian Research Council and Statoil for financial sup-
port. Sørgard’s research was partly undertaken during a visit to the
Department of Economics at the University of California, Santa Bar-
bara, whose hospitality is gratefully acknowledged.
29
References
Bárcena-Ruiz, J.C. and M.B. Garzón, 2000. Corporate merger, organi-
zational form, and control of labor. Spanish Economic Review 2,
129-144.
Baye, M.R., K.J. Crocker and J. Ju, 1996. Divisionalization, franchis-
ing, and divestiture incentives in oligopoly. American Economic
Review 86, 223-236.
Brander, J.A. and B.J. Spencer, 1985. Export subsidies and market
share rivalry. Journal of International Economics 15, 313-321.
Buchanan, R.T., 1974. Merger waves in British unionism. Industrial
Relations Journal 5, 37-44.
Buchanan, R.T., 1981. Mergers in British trade unions 1949-79. In-
dustrial Relations Journal 12, 40-49.
Bughin, J., 1999. The strategic choice of union-oligopoly bargaining
agenda. International Journal of Industrial Organization 17, 1029-
1040.
Chitayat, G., 1979. Trade union mergers and labour conglomerates.
New York: Praeger.
Creane, A. and C. Davidson, 2000. Multidivisional firms, staggered
competition and the merger paradox. Manuscript, Michigan State
University.
Cremieux, P.-Y. and M. Van Audenrode, 1996. Mergers and bargaining
in the airline industry. Labour 10, 297-318.
Davidson, C., 1988. Multiunit bargaining in oligopolistic industries.
Journal of Labor Economics 6, 397-422.
Deneckere, R. and C. Davidson, 1985. Incentives to form coalitions with
Bertrand competition. Rand Journal of Economics 16, 473-486.
Dhillon, A. and E. Petrakis, 2002. A generalised wage rigidity result.
International Journal of Industrial Organisation 20, 285-311.
Dowrick, S., 1989. Union-oligopoly bargaining. Economic Journal 99,
1123-1142.
Espinosa, M.P. and C. Rhee, 1989. Eﬃcient wage bargaining as a
repeated game. Quarterly Journal of Economics 104, 565-588.
30
Farrell, J. and C. Shapiro, 1990a. Horizontal mergers: an equilibrium
analysis. American Economic Review 80, 107-126.
Farrell, J. and C. Shapiro, 1990b. Asset ownership and market struc-
ture in oligopoly. Rand Journal of Economics 21, 275-292
Fridolfsson, S.-O. and J. Stennek, 2000a. Holdup of endogenous merg-
ers. Mimeo, Research Institute for Industrial Economics (IUI).
Fridolfsson, S.-O. and J. Stennek, 2000b. Why mergers reduce profits
and raise share-prices - a theory of preemptive mergers. Mimeo,
Research Institute for Industrial Economics (IUI).
Geroski, P. and K.G. Knight, 1984. Corporate merger and collective
bargaining in the UK. Industrial Relations Journal 15, 51-60.
Gokhale, J., E. Groshen and D. Neumark, 1995. Do hostile takeovers
reduce extramarginal wage payments? Review of Economics and
Statistics, 77, 470-485.
González-Maestre, M. and J. Lópes-Cuñat, 2001. Delegation and merg-
ers in oligopoly. International Journal of Industrial Organization
19, 1213-1244.
Hekmat, A., 1995. The eﬀects of diﬀerent types of mergers on union
and non-union wages in the United States. Journal of Economics
21, 65-69.
Horn, H. and A. Wolinsky, 1988a. Bilateral monopolies and incentives
for merger. Rand Journal of Economics 19, 408-19.
Horn, H. and A. Wolinsky, 1988b. Worker substitutability and patterns
of unionisation. Economic Journal 98, 484-97.
Horn, H. and L. Persson, 2001a. Endogenous mergers in concentrated
markets. International Journal of Industrial Organization 19, 1213-
1244.
Horn, H. and L. Persson, 2001b. The equilibrium ownership structure
of an international oligopoly. Journal of International Economics
53, 307-333.
Huck, S., K.A. Konrad and W. Müller, 2003. Profitable horizontal
mergers without cost advantages: the role of internal organisation,
information, and market structure. Economica, forthcoming.
31
Huck, S. and K.A. Konrad, 2002. Merger profitability and trade policy.
Mimeo, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB).
Lommerud, K.E. and L. Sørgard, 1997. Merger and product range
rivalry. International Journal of Industrial Organization 16, 21-42.
Lommerud, K.E, O.R. Straume and L. Sørgard, 2000. Merger prof-
itability in unionized oligopoly. Working Paper in Economics No.
10/2000, University of Bergen.
Lommerud, K.E., F. Meland and L. Sørgard, 2003. Unionised oligopoly,
trade liberalisation and location choice. Economic Journal, forth-
coming.
McAfee, R.P. and M.A. Williams, 1992. Horizontal mergers and anti-
trust policy. Journal of Industrial Economics 40, 181-187.
McGuckin, R.H., S.V. Nguyen and A.P. Reznak, 1995. The impact of
ownership on employment, wages and labor productivity in U.S.
manufacturing 1977-87. Discussion Paper 95/08, Bureau of the
Census, Center for Economic Studies.
Naylor, R., 1998. International trade and economic integration when
labour markets are generally unionised. European Economic Re-
view 42, 1251-1267.
Norbäck, P.-J. and L. Persson, 2002. Investment liberalization - who
benefits from cross-border mergers and acquisitions? Centre for
Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 3166.
Peoples, J., A. Hekmat and A.H. Moini, 1993. Corporate mergers and
union wage premiums. Journal of Economics and Finance 17, 65-
75.
Perry, M.K. and R.H. Porter, 1985. Oligopoly and the incentives for
horizontal merger. American Economic Review 75, 219-227.
Petrakis, E., and M. Vlassis, 2000. Endogenous scope of bargaining in
oligopoly. Labour Economics 7, 261-281.
Salant, S., S. Switzer and R.J. Reynolds, 1983. Losses from horizontal
merger: the eﬀects of an exogenous change in industry structure
on Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics 98,
185-199.
Stigler, G.J., 1950. Monopoly and oligopoly by merger. American
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 40, 23-34.
32
Straume, O.R., 2002. Union collusion and intra-industry trade. Inter-
national Journal of Industrial Organization 20, 631-652.
Straume, O.R., 2003. International mergers and trade liberalisation:
implications for unionised labour. International Journal of Indus-
trial Organization 21, 717-735.
UNCTAD, 2000. World investment report 2000: Overview, United
Nations. (Available at http://www.unctad.org)
Ziss, S., 2001. Horizontal mergers and delegation. International Jour-
nal of Industrial Organization 19, 471-492.
33
PUBLICATIONS FROM THE GLOBALIZATION PROGRAM, ROKKANSENTERET  
 
The publications can be ordered from Rokkansenteret, tel +47 55 58 97 10,   
e-mail: post@rokkan.uib.no, http://www.rokkansenteret.uib.no 
 
WORKING PAPERS 
 
2003 
4‐2003  Kjell Erik Lommerud, Frode Meland and Lars Sørgard: «Unionised Oligopoly, Trade Liberalisation and 
Location Choice». March 2003.   
8‐2003  Rune Ervik: «Global Normative Standards and National Solutions for Pension Provision: The World 
Bank, ILO, Norway and South Africa in Comparative Perspective». April 2003. 
11‐2003   Nina Berven: «Cross National Comparison and National Contexts: Is what we Compare Comparable». 
July 2003. 
15‐2003   Ilcheong Yi: «The National Patterns of Unemployment Policies in Two Asian Countries: Malaysia and 
South Korea». September 2003. 
25‐2003  Kjell Erik Lommerud, Odd Rune Straume and Lars Sørgard: «Downstream merger with upstream market 
power».  December 2003. 
2002 
12-2002 Nina Berven: «National Politics and Global Ideas? Welfare, Work and Legitimacy in Norway and the 
United States». September 2002.  
13-2002 Johannes Hjellbrekke: «Globalisering som utfordring til samfunnsvitskapane». September 2002.  
14-2002 Atle Møen: «Den globale produksjonen av symbol og kunnskap. Verdsflukt og verdsherredømme». 
September 2002.  
19-2002 Marit Tjomsland: «Arbeidsinnvandringssituasjonen i Norge etter 1975». November 2002.  
20‐2002  Augustín José Menéndez m.fl.: «Taxing Europe. The Case for European Taxes in Federal Perspective». 
December 2002.  
21‐2002  Fredrik Andersson and Kai A. Konrad: «Globalization and Risky Human Capital Investment».December 
2002.  
22‐2002  Fredrik Andersson and Kai A. Konrad: «Human Capital Investment and Globalization in Extortionary 
States». December 2002.  
REPORTS 
2003 
12‐2003  Birte Bjørkelo: «The Power of Learning in the Global Age ‒ The World Bank and Environmental NGOs». 
December 2003.  
13‐2003  Ingrid Hagen:  «Global  konkurranse  og  lokal  fleksibilitet. Omstillinger  og  fleksibilitetsstrategier  i  en 
norsk elektronikkbedrift». Oktober 2003. 
14‐2003  Mariann Moberg: Engasjement og trygghet i et mer globalisert arbeidsliv. En studie av endringsprosesser i et 
multinasjonalt konsern i lys av trekk ved den nye kapitalismens ånd. Oktober 2003.  
WORKING PAPERS ROKKANSENTERET (ISSN 1503-0946) 
 
The publications can be ordered from Rokkansenteret, tel +47 55 58 97 10, 
e-mail: post@rokkan.uib.no, http://www.rokkansenteret.uib.no 
 
2003 
1‐2003  Tom Christensen og Per Lægreid: «Politisk styring og privatisering: holdninger i elitene og befolkningen». 
Mars 2003. 
2‐2003  Ivar Bleiklie, Per Lægreid and Marjoleine H. Wik: «Changing Government Control in Norway: High Civil 
Service, Universities and Prisons». March 2003. 
3‐2003  Badi H. Baltagi, Espen Bratberg and Tor Helge Holmås: «A Panel Data Study of Physiciansʹ Labor Supply: 
The Case of Norway». March 2003. HEB. 
4‐2003  Kjell Erik Lommerud, Frode Meland and Lars Sørgard: «Unionised Oligopoly, Trade Liberalisation and 
Location Choice». March 2003.  The Globalization Program. 
5‐2003  Lise Hellebø: «Nordic Alcohol Policy and Globalization as a Changing Force». April 2003. 
6‐2003  Kim Ove Hommen: «Tilsynsroller i samferdselssektoren». April 2003. 
7‐2003  Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid: «Trust in Government – the Significance of Attitudes Towards 
Democracy, the Public Sector and Public Sector Reforms». April 2003. 
8‐2003  Rune Ervik: «Global Normative Standards and National Solutions for Pension Provision: The World 
Bank, ILO, Norway and South Africa in Comparative Perspective». April 2003. The Globalization 
Program. 
9‐2003  Nanna Kildal: «The Welfare State: Three Normative Tensions». Mai 2003. 
10‐2003  Simon Neby: «Politisk styring og institusjonell autonomi – tre illustrasjoner». Mai 2003. 
11‐2003  Nina Berven: «Cross National Comparison and National Contexts: Is what we Compare Comparable?». 
July 2003. The Globalization Program. 
12‐2003  Hilde Hatleskog Zeiner: «Kontrollhensyn og kontrollpraksis. En studie av Food and Veterinary Office 
(FVO)». August 2003. 
13‐2003 Nanna Kildal: «Perspectives on Policy Transfer: The Case of the OECD». August 2003. 
14‐2003 Erik Allardt: «Two Lectures: Stein Rokkan and the Twentieth Century Social Science». 
«Den sociala rapporteringens tidstypiska förankring». September 2003. 
15‐2003  Ilcheong Yi: «The National Patterns of Unemployment Policies in Two Asian Countries: Malaysia and 
South Korea». September 2003. The Globalization Program. 
16‐2003 Dag Arne Christensen: «Active Ageing: Country Report Norway». November 2003. 
17‐2003 Kim Ove Hommen: «Tilsynspolitikk i Norge: Utflytting og autonomi». November 2003. 
18‐2003  Dag Arne Christensen, Rune Ervik and Ingrid Helgøy: «The Impact of Institutional Legacies on Active 
Ageing Policies: Norway and UK as Contrasting Cases». December 2003. 
19‐2003  Ole Frithjof Norheim og Benedicte Carlsen: «Legens doble rolle som advokat og portvakt i  Fastlege‐
ordningen. Evaluering av fastlegeordningen». Desember 2003. HEB. 
20‐2003  Kurt R. Brekke og Odd Rune Straume: «Pris‐ og avanseregulering i legemiddelmarkedet. En prinsipiell 
diskusjon og en vurdering av den norske modellen». Desember 2003. HEB. 
21‐2003  Per Lægreid, Vidar W. Rolland, Paul G. Roness and John‐Erik Ågotnes: «The Structural Anatomy of the 
Norwegian State 1947‒2003». December 2003. 
22‐2003  Ivar Bleiklie, Haldor Byrkjeflot and Katarina Östergren: «Taking Power from Knowledge. A Theoretical 
Framework for the Study of Two Public Sector Reforms». December 2003. ATM.  
23‐2003  Per Lægreid, Ståle Opedal and Inger Marie Stigen: «The Norwegian Hospital Reform – Balancing Political 
Control and Enterprise Autonomy». December 2003. ATM. 
24‐2003  Håkon Høst: «Kompetansemåling eller voksenutdanning i pleie‐ og omsorgsfagene? Underveisrapport 
fra en studie av pleie‐ og omsorgsutdanningene». Desember 2003. 
25‐2003  Kjell Erik Lommerud, Odd Rune Straume and Lars Sørgard: «Downstream merger with upstream market 
power».  The Globalization Program. December 2003. 
2002 
1-2002 Håkon Høst:  «Lærlingeordning eller skolebasert utdanning i pleie- og omsorgsfagene?». April 2002. 
2-2002 Jan-Kåre Breivik, Hilde Haualand and Per Solvang:  «Rome – a Temporary Deaf City! Deaflympics 2001». 
June 2002. 
3-2002 Jan-Kåre Breivik, Hilde Haualand og  Per Solvang: «Roma – en midlertidig døv by! Deaflympics 2001». 
Juni 2002. 
4-2002 Christian Madsen: «Spiller det noen rolle? – om hverdagen på nye og gamle sykehjem». Juni 2002. 
5-2002 Elin Aasmundrud Mathiesen: «Fritt sykehusvalg. En teoretisk analyse av konkurranse i det norske 
sykehusmarkedet». Juni 2002. HEB. 
6-2002 Tor Helge Holmås: «Keeping Nurses at Work: A Duration Analysis». June 2002. HEB. 
7-2002 Ingvild Halland Ørnsrud: «Mål- og resultatstyring gjennom statlige budsjettreformer». Juli 2002. 
8-2002 Torstein Haaland: «Tid, situasjonisme og institusjonell utakt i systemer». Juli 2002. 
9-2002 Kristin Strømsnes: «Samspillet mellom frivillig organisering og demokrati: Teoretiske argument og 
empirisk dokumentasjon». August 2002. 
10-2002 Marjoleine Hooijkaas Wik: «Mangfold eller konformitet? Likheter og forskjeller innenfor og mellom fem 
statlige tilknytningsformer». August 2002. 
11-2002 Knut Helland:«Den opprinnelige symbiosen mellom fotball og presse». September 2002. 
12-2002 Nina Berven: «National Politics and Global Ideas? Welfare, Work and Legitimacy in Norway and the 
United States». September 2002. The Globalization Program. 
13-2002 Johannes Hjellbrekke: «Globalisering som utfordring til samfunnsvitskapane». September 2002. 
Globaliseringsprogrammet. 
14-2002 Atle Møen: «Den globale produksjonen av symbol og kunnskap. Verdsflukt og verdsherredømme». 
September 2002. Globaliseringsprogrammet. 
15-2002 Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid: «Complex Patterns of Interaction and Influence Among Political and 
Administrative Leaders». October 2002. 
16-2002 Ivar Bleiklie: «Hierarchy and Specialization. On Institutional Integration of Higher Education Systems». 
Oktober 2002. 
17-002 Per Lægreid, Runolfur Smari Steinthorsson and Baldur Thorhallsson: «Europeanization of Public 
Administration: Effects of the EU on the Central Administration in the Nordic States». November 2002. 
18-2002 Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid: «Trust in Government — the Relative Importance of Service 
Satisfaction, Political Factors and Demography». November 2002. 
19-2002 Marit Tjomsland: «Arbeidsinnvandringssituasjonen i Norge etter 1975». November 2002. 
Globaliseringsprogrammet. 
20‐2002  Augustín José Menéndez m.fl.: «Taxing Europe. The Case for European Taxes in Federal Perspective». 
December 2002. The Globalization Program. 
21‐2002  Fredrik Andersson and Kai A. Konrad: «Globalization and Risky Human Capital Investment».December 
2002. The Globalization Program. 
22‐2002  Fredrik Andersson and Kai A. Konrad: «Human Capital Investment and Globalization in Extortionary 
States». December 2002. The Globalization Program. 
23‐2002  Anne Lise Fimreite, Yngve Flo og Jacob Aars: «Generalistkommune og oppgavedifferensiering. Tre 
innlegg». Desember 2002.  
24‐2002  Knut Grove: «Frå privat initiativ til kommunalt monopol. Lysverk, sporvegar og renovasjon i Bergen og 
Oslo 1850–1935». Desember 2002. 
25‐2002  Knut Grove: «Mellom ʹnon‐interventionʹ og ʹsamfundsvillieʹ. Statleg og kommunal regulering av 
økonomisk verksemd i Norge på 1800‐talet». Desember 2002. 
26‐2002  Dag Arne Christensen: «Hovedtyper av valgordninger. Proporsjonalitet eller politisk styring?». 
Desember 2002. 
27‐2002  Jan Erik Askildsen, Badi H. Baltagi and Tor Helge Holmås: «Will Increased Wages Reduce Shortage of 
Nurses? A Panel Data Analysis f Nursesʹ Labour Supply». December 2002. HEB. 
28‐2002  Sturla Gjesdal, Peder R. Ringdal, Kjell Haug and John Gunnar Mæland: «Medical Predictors of Disability 
Pension in Long‐Term Sickness Absence. December 2002. HEB. 
29‐2002  Dag Arne Christensen og Jacob Aars: «Teknologi og demokrati. Med norske kommuner på nett!». 
Desember 2002. 
30‐2002  Jacob Aars: «Byfolk og politikk. Gjennomgang av data fra en befolkningsundersøkelse i Bergen, Oslo og 
Tromsø». Desember 2002. 
31‐2002  Hjørdis Grove: «Kommunaliseringsprosessen i Århus 1850–1940». Desember 2002. 
 
